K-Content IP Sovereignty: The Crisis of Revenue Models and the Path to Industrial Restructuring
On November 11th, 2025, I participated as a discussant at the National Assembly forum titled “Policy Directions for Securing K-Content IP Sovereignty and Revitalizing the Domestic Industry,” hosted by the National Assembly’s Media & Communications Forum.
The Real Crisis: Not Production Capability, But Revenue Models
Professor Lee Seong-min’s presentation accurately diagnosed the structural problems facing the K-content industry. I fully agree with the core argument that this is “a crisis of revenue models, not production capability.” In my discussion, I applied a business economics framework to deepen the analysis, focusing on the gap between IP ownership and IP utilization.
1. The Essence of the Crisis: Collapse of Derived Demand and Monopsony Market Structure
The broadcasting industry data is stark. In 2024, revenue declined by 0.9%, and operating profit plummeted by 26.7%. More seriously, advertising revenue decreased from 2.7 trillion won in 2020 to 2.3 trillion won in 2024 — a loss of 420 billion won. This represents a structural collapse of derived demand for content.
The domestic OTT situation reveals another dimension. OTT usage reached 89.3% in 2024, indicating market saturation, while average monthly spending on paid OTT actually decreased from 12,005 won to 10,500 won.
2. IP’s Real Options Value and the Utilization Gap
Content IP isn’t merely an asset but a right to create uncertain future value streams. The Squid Game case demonstrates this perfectly. Netflix systematically realizes option time value and volatility premium.
An important misconception must be corrected. Currently, only about 15% of global OTT deals involve complete IP abandonment. The remaining 85% already involve shared IP investment and revenue distribution. So what’s the real problem? Not IP ownership itself, but the inability to utilize secured IP.
3. The Real Crisis: Volume Decrease and Ecosystem Collapse
Production dropped from 141 titles in 2022 to 107 in 2024. As global OTTs shift to efficiency phases, they invest only in proven projects, raising entry barriers.
4. Global Value Chain and Industrial Restructuring
The Korean content industry has fully integrated into the global value chain. This is an irreversible structural change. Korea has world-class competitiveness in planning and production, but substantial funding, most global distribution and marketing, and actual execution of secondary utilization are primarily led by global platforms.
5. Policy Roles: Building IP Utilization Ecosystems
First, foster Korean-style production committees. Like the Demon Slayer model, strategies that prove success in strong domestic markets before global expansion are needed.
Second, establish a K-IP Commercialization Agency. This agency should integrate existing programs while focusing on actual matching with global brands.
Third, strengthen domestic ecosystem self-sustainability. Securing domestic demand is the core of negotiation power.
Fourth, consider selective financial support as an initial catalyst. A K-IP Utilization Fund can serve as the initial catalyst.
Conclusion
The goal is not to exclude global OTTs but to equip domestic platforms with negotiation power. Just as Demon Slayer first proved success in the Japanese market and leveraged that to contract with Netflix on favorable terms, Korea should create a structure where it first proves success through strong domestic platforms in the first window, then cooperates with global OTTs as equal partners.